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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT-
SEMI-MONTHLY PAYDAY LAWS
The Georgia Code requires certain employers to pay their
employees twice per monthi and further provides that if such
employers wilfully refuse to make such payments they shall be
fined.2 Defendant demurred to his indictment under these sec-
tions on the ground that they are unconstitutional. The demurrer
was overruled, and the defendant was convicted. On appeal,
held: judgment reversed. The involuntary attendance at his
criminal trial of a person accused under these sections is im-
prisonment for debt and is prohibited 3 by the Georgia Consti-
tution.4
The constitutionality of semi-monthly payday laws has been
questioned on two different grounds. One type of attack directly
denies the power of the legislature to dictate terms into the em-
ployment contract. These attacks are based on freedom of con-
tract and raise questions of "due process," class legislation,
denial of "equal protection," and the impairment of the obliga-
tions of contracts. The courts, however, have held that the semi-
monthly payday laws are a valid exercise of the police power
and that the freedom of contract may be subordinated to the
public interest in the welfare of the wage earner.5 Recognition
is given to the economic inequality of the employer and employee
1. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-102 (1933):
Every person, firm, or corporation,. . . employing wageworkers,...
who may be employed by the month or year at stipulated salaries, shall
make payments in check or lawful money of the United States to said
employees or to their authorized representatives; such payments to be
made on such dates during the month as may be decided upon by such
person, firm, or corporation: Provided, however, that the dates so
selected shall be such that the month will be divided into at least two
equal periods; and the payments made on each such date shall in every
case correspond to the full net amount of wages or earnings due said
employees, laborers, or wageworkers for the period for which said pay-
ment is made.
2. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-9901 (1933):
In case any employer contemplated by section 66-102 shall refuse or
wilfully fail to make payments to the wage-earner, of wages or earn-
ings when demanded, as therein required, upon the regular days of pay-
ment, such employer, the members of the firm, the directors, officers,
and superintendents or managers of corporations and associations shall,
upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $200; insol-
vency shall be the only defense to an indictment for such an offense, ....
3. GA. CONS',. Art. I, § 1, par. 21: "There shall be no imprisonment for
debt."
4. Messenger v. State, 72 S.E.2d 460 (Ga. 1952).
5. Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 (1914); Arizona Power Co. v.
State, 19 Ariz. 114, 166 Pac. 275 (1917); Arkansas Stave Co. v. State, 94
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which results in the inability of the employee to force semi-
monthly cash payments of wages. In addition, it has been held
that the semi-monthly payday laws do not violate the United
States Constitution. 6
The other attack admits the power to regulate the terms of
employment but contends that the method adopted by the legis-
lature to enforce such regulation is unconstitutional. This at-
tack is based upon the constitutional prohibitions against im-
prisonment for debt, and its success depends largely on the
jurisdiction. The wording of the prohibition varies from state
to state; nor do all state constitutions limit such imprisonment.
The provision in some states is absolute, in some states fraud
cases are specifically exempted from the limitation, and in some
states the provision does not apply unless the debtor transfers
all his property to his creditors.7 Also, the semi-monthly payday
laws are not uniform; some states do not have them, in some
states they apply only to corporations, in some states their viola-
tion is criminal, in some states the only penalty for their vio-
lation is extra damages in civil actions to recover wages, and in
some states both the civil and criminal penalties attach.8
Of the semi-monthly payday laws which provide criminal
sanctions many impose fines but not imprisonment. Of course,
such a statute would be unconsitutional if it resulted in actual
pre-trial confinement. 9 In the principal case the court held that
although the statute provided for a fine only, the involuntary
attendance of the defendant at the trial constituted imprison-
ment. Although this is the only case in which such a broad
definition of imprisonment has been applied to invalidate a semi-
monthly payday law, equally broad definitions have been used in
tort actions for false imprisonment.0 Furthermore, the court in
Ark. 27, 125 A.W. 1001 (1910); Commonwealth v. Reinecke Coal Mining
Co., 117 Ky. 885, 79 S.W. 287 (1904) ; State v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 242 Mo.
339, 147 S.W. 118 (1912) ; State v. Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co., 18
R.I. 16, 25 AtI. 246 (1892). But cf. Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Norcowich,
121 Ind. 600, 99 N.E.2d 268 (1951) ; Livingston v. Susquehanna Oil Co., 113
Kan. 702, 216 Pac. 296 (1923).
6. Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685 (1914).
7. Smith, The Constitutionality of Bimonthly Pay Day Laws, 16 TENN. L.
REV. 940, 949 (1941).
8. Id. at 940.
9. In re Crane, 26 Cal. App. 22, 145 Pac. 733 (1914).
10. Watkins v. Oakland Jockey Club, 86 F. Supp. 1006, 1017 (W.D. Ark.
1949): 'Every confinement of the person is an imprisonment, and any express
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1953/iss2/5
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the similar case of State v. Prudential Coal Co.," reached the
same result as the principal case but employed a different
rationale. In that case it was held that a payday law which
provided for a fine was unconstitutional because if the defendant
refused to pay the fine, he would be imprisoned to enforce the
payment of the fine, and such imprisonment would indirectly
be imprisonment for the non-payment of wages and therefore
barred by the constitution.
On the other hand the attack based on the imprisonment for
debt clause will fail against payday laws applicable only to cor-
porate defendants. Such statutes cannot violate restrictions on
imprisonment for debt because of the physical impossibility of
imprisoning a corporate defendant. 2 The statutes which provide
only for civil penalties for infringement likewise do not violate
the imprisonment for debt clauses since they make no provision
for imprisonment.13
It has been said that the imprisonment for debt provisions do
not apply to criminal actions,1 4 but the courts generally have held
that the legislature cannot make the mere non-payment of a debt
a crime and thus accomplish indirectly what they are forbidden
to do directly. 5 In those states which have a specific or implied
exception in the imprisonment for debt clauses of their consti-
tutions, statutes which make only the fraudulent non-payment of
wages criminal are immune to attack on an imprisonment for
debt ground.1" The legislature, however, is limited in what it
can declare presumptive evidence of fraud; presumptions created
or implied threat of force whereby one is deprived of his liberty or compelled
to go where he does not wish to go is an imprisonment ... " National Bond
& Investment Co. v. Whithorn, 276 Ky. 204, 209, 123 S.W.2d 263, 266(1938) : ". .. Any exercise of force, by which in fact the other person is
deprived of his liberty, compelled to remain where he does not wish to re-
main, or to go where he does not wish to go is an imprisonment."
11. 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S.W. 56 (1914).
12. Arizona Power Co. v. State, 19 Ariz. 114, 166 Pac. 275 (1917) ; accord,
Commonwealth v. Reinecke Coal Mining Co., 117 Ky. 885, 79 S.W. 287
(1904); State v. Missouri Pacific Ry., 242 Mo. 339, 147 S.W. 118 (1912).
13. Moore v. Indian Spring Channel Gold Mining Co., 37 Cal. App. 370,
174 Pac. 378 (1918) ; Standard Liquors, Inc. v. Norcowich, 121 Ind. 600, 99
N.E.2d 268 (1951); McGinnis v. Keen, 189 Ore. 445, 221 P.2d 907 (1950);
accord, State v. Prudential Coal Co., 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S.W. 56 (1914).
14. Ex parte Nowak, 184 Cal. 701, 195 Pac. 402 (1921) ; Ex parte Britton,
127 Tex. 85, 92 S.W.2d 224 (1936).
15. Ex parte Trombley, 31 Cal. 2d 801, 193 P.2d 734 (1948) ; In re Crane,
26 Cal. App. 22, 145 Pac. 733 (1914); State v. Prudential Coal Co., 130
Tenn. 275, 170 S.W. 56 (1914).
16. Ex parte Trombley, supra note 15.
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by the legislature must not be arbitrary and unreasonable; they
must have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life.I
It is doubtful, therefore, if the mere non-payment of wages could
be declared presumptive evidence of fraud. One court, however,
held that a wilful refusal to pay, when the employer had the
ability to pay, was fraudulent in itself and therefore within the
the fraud exception to the prohibition on imprisonment for debt.1"
Semi-monthly payday laws are constitutional unless they vio-
late a constitutional restriction against imprisonment for debt.
Such constitutional restrictions are violated only by statutes
imposing criminal sanctions, either fines or imprisonment, on
non-corporate offenders for the non-fraudulent non-payment of
wages.19 Presumably, even this type of statute does not violate
the constitutional restriction in those states which require that
the debtor transfer all his property to his creditors, except in
the case of an employer who is in fact insolvent. The amount
of legislation on this subject indicates that many legislatures
feel that regular, short-term, cash payments to employees are
necessary to the well-being of the society. The liberty of the
citizen, however, is much prized in our society, and the bar on
criminal sanctions to enforce semi-monthly payday laws in the
individual employer situation seems highly desirable.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SCOPE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
Defendant, a Mexican, claimed that he was denied equal pro-
tection of the law in his trial and conviction for murder because
members of his nationality had been systematically and wilfully
excluded from the grand and petit juries before which his cause
was heard. Evidence that there were some Mexicans qualified
for jury service but that none had been called for twenty-five
years was heard, but there was no direct testimony showing dis-
crimination by the state officers. Defendant's motion to have the
17. Tot v. United States 319 U.S. 463 (1943); Taylor v. Georgia, 315
U.S. 25 (1941); Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934).
18. Ex parte Trombley, 31 Cal. 2d 801, 193 P.2d 734 (1948) (even though
the element of deception, usually essential to fraud, is absent).
19. In re Crane, 26 Cal. App. 22, 145 Pac. 733 (1914) ; State v. Prudential
Coal Co., 130 Tenn. 275, 170 S.W. 56 (1914) ; accord, McGinnis v. Keen, 189
Ore. 445, 221 P.2d 907 (1950).
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